Greenspan's Monetary Policy in Retrospect by David R. Henderson & Jeffrey Hummel
Greenspan’s Monetary Policy
in Retrospect
Discretion or Rules?
by David R. Henderson and Jeffrey Rogers Hummel
David R. Henderson, a research fellow with the Hoover Institution and an associate professor of economics at the Naval
Postgraduate School, is the editor of The Concise Encyclopedia of Economics. Jeffrey Rogers Hummel is an associate
professor of economics at San Jose State University and author of Emancipating Slaves, Enslaving Free Men: A History
of the American Civil War.
No. 109
Is Alan Greenspan to blame for the current
housing bubble and the ongoing financial crisis? A
growing chorus charges the formerFederalReserve
chairman with being an “inflationist” whose loose
monetary policy caused or significantly con-
tributed to our current economic troubles. How-
ever, althoughGreenspan’s policies weren’t perfect,
hismonetarypolicywas in fact tight, andhis legacy
is one of having overseen low and stable inflation
and a striking dampening of the business cycle.
Critics charge Greenspan with having carried
on an excessively expansionary monetary policy,
particularly following the recession of 2001. They
note how low interest rates were from 2002
through 2004 and argue that those low rates
paved the way for everything from high prices at
thepump tohighprices at the supermarket, from
the housing crisis to the financial crisis.
In so doing, those critics make the classic mis-
take of using interest rates to evaluate monetary
policy, reasoning that if interest rates are low,
recentmonetarypolicymusthavebeen expansion-
ary. It is not the Federal Reserve but supply and
demand that ultimately determines interest rates.
Althoughcentral banks canpush ratesupordown
to some degree, the globally integrated financial
system reduces the Fed’s ability to significantly
influence rates.
This paper should not be construed as a
defense of all of Greenspan’s policies, nor of cen-
tral banking or the Federal Reserve. In fact, our
preference would be to abolish the Fed and
deregulate the banking industry. Barring that,
we argue that Federal Reserve policy ought to
abide by the rules rather than the discretion of
its chairman.
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Introduction
Former Federal Reserve chairman Alan
Greenspan has become everyone’s favorite
scapegoat. His policies allegedly caused, or at
least contributed to, the current financial cri-
sis. He is attacked from the left for lax finan-
cial regulation, from the right for loosemone-
tary policy, and from the middle for both. Yet
two years ago, on leaving office, Greenspan
was widely heralded as a financial wizard
whose wise, discretionary macromanagement
hadbrought anunprecedented twodecadesof
low inflation, high prosperity, and infrequent
andmild recessions. Both viewpoints, in reali-
ty, are mistaken.1
During the Keynesian dark ages, persisting
through the mid-1970s, no one, except a few
monetary cranks along with monetarist econ-
omists cloistered in their academic ivory tow-
ers, believed that the Federal Reserve’s mone-
tary policy even mattered. This was a period
when Paul Samuelson, who would go on to
win the1970NobelPrize inEconomics the sec-
ond time it was awarded, could proclaim in a
1969 Newsweek column that “there is no sight
in the world more awful than that of an old-
time economist, foam-flecked at the mouth
and hell-bent to cure inflation by monetary
discipline. God willing, we shan’t soon see his
like again.” Today almost everyone—econo-
mists, investors, and the general public alike—
seems tohave swerved to the opposite extreme.
The Fed not only controls inflation but
allegedly everything else that happens to the
American economy, whether good or bad. The
truth, however, is somewhere in themiddle.2
We are not arguing that Greenspan’s poli-
cies were perfect. Nor should anything that
follows be construed as a defense of central
banking or of the Federal Reserve. Particularly
alarming is the way the lender-of-last-resort
function has been expanding the moral-haz-
ard safety net and mispricing risk, a trend to
which Greenspan no doubt contributed. Our
preferred ideal would combine abolition of
the Fed and unregulated free banking.
Nonetheless, AlanGreenspan stands out as
the most competent—and arguably the only
competent—helmsman of United Statesmon-
etary policy since the creation of the Federal
Reserve System. AsMilton Friedmanobserved
uponGreenspan’s retirement, “For the first 70
years after it opened in 1914, the Fed did far
more harm than good, presiding over infla-
tion in two World Wars, converting a moder-
ate recession into the great depression, and
then in 1970s, producing the most serious
peacetime inflation in our nation’s history.”
By contrast, Greenspan’s “performance has
indeed been remarkable.”3
Greenspan not only oversaw relatively low
and stable inflation, but also ushered in a
striking decline in the volatility of real gross
domestic product. Although defenders of
macroeconomic intervention often suggest
that government policies after World War II
dampened business cycles, the truly signifi-
cant change should be dated at 1987, the year
Greenspan assumed office. The current fuss
about a recession thatmay not even have hap-
pened yet testifies to how high his legacy has
raised the bar. Until a year or so ago, many
observers had therefore credited Greenspan
with being the best at reading the economic
tea leaves. But as we will demonstrate, the
source of Greenspan’s apparent success has
little to do withmonetary discretion.4
Freezing Total Reserves
Recently converted critics are now charg-
ing Greenspan with having carried on an
excessively expansionary monetary policy,
particularly following the recession of 2001
and possibly during the dot-com boom that
preceded it. But an objective examination of
his record of nearly two decades shows that
he did not. Instead, however unintentionally
and unwittingly, he came close to freezing
the domestic monetary base and deregulated
the broader monetary aggregates.
Why do people now believe Greenspanwas
an “inflationist”? For one main reason: they
note how low interest rates were from 2002
through 2004. But interest rates have never
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proved an adequate gauge of what the Fed is
doing: not during theGreatDepression, when
rates were very low despite a collapsingmoney
stock; not during the Great Inflation of the
1970s, when rates were high despite an ex-
panding money stock; and not under Green-
span. A focus on interest rates not only
obscures the well-known distinction between
nominal and real rates (nominal rates equal
real rates plus expected inflation), it also
ignores the simple fact that interest rates can
change as a result of real factors involving sup-
ply and demand.
The market ultimately determines interest
rates. Although central banks are big enough
players in the loan market (and the quintes-
sential noise traders to boot) that they can
push short-term rates up or down somewhat,
that ability is increasingly diminished, even for
amajor central bank like the Fed, as globaliza-
tion integrates world financial markets. In
defending his actions, Greenspan is correct in
attributing the unusually low interest rates
early this decade mainly to a massive flow of
savings from emerging Asian economies and
elsewhere.5
A better, although now unfashionable, way
to judgemonetary policy is to look at themon-
etarymeasures:MZM,M2,M1, and themone-
tary base. Since 2001, the annual year-to-year
growth rate of MZM fell from over 20 percent
to nearly 0 percent by 2006. During that same
time, M2 growth fell from over 10 percent to
around2percentandM1growth fell fromover
10 percent to negative rates. Admittedly the
Fed’s control over the broadermonetary aggre-
gates has become quite attenuated, for reasons
elucidated below. But even the year-to-year
annual growth rate of themonetary base since
2001 fell from10percent to below 5 percent in
2006 and by June of 2008 was around 1.5 per-
cent, despite Ben S. Bernanke’s alleged refla-
tion. When all of these measures agree, it sug-
gests that monetary policy was not all that
expansionary during 2002 and 2003 under
Greenspan, despite the low interest rates.6
The key to what was really going on is the
monetary base, which the Federal Reserve
directly controls. The base consists of reserves
held by the banks and other depositories,
either in their accounts at the Fed or as vault
cash, plus currency in circulation among the
general public. Between December 1986, 8
months before Greenspan became Fed chair-
man, and December 2005, 19 years later, the
monetary base rose by a hefty amount, from
$248 billion to $802 billion (no figures are sea-
sonally adjusted). True, that doesn’t sound like
a freeze. But virtually thewhole increase was in
currency in circulation. (See Figure 1.) During
that same time, total bank reserves grew from
$65 billion to $73 billion, for an average annu-
al growth rate of a mere 0.65 percent. (These
figures are unadjusted for any changes in
reserve requirements and—unlike the some-
what misleading reserve totals reported by the
Fed’s board of governors—include all vault
cash, clearing balances, and float.) In some
years aggregate reserves rose; in others they fell,
with the major bump surrounding Y2K, when
the accumulation of reserves by banks appears
to have induced the Fed to accommodate a 40
percent jump followed by a 30-percent drop.
Total reserves are also the one monetary mea-
sure that show a slight uptick into 2003, when
interest rates were down.7
During the same 19 years, currency in cir-
culation exploded faster than the monetary
base, at an annual rate of 7.54 percent. Prior to
this explosion, currency was less than three
quarters of the total monetary base; today it is
over 90 percent. In a period when debit cards
and possibly ATMs were reducing currency
demand, analysts were aware that all this new
cashwas not bulging in the wallets and purses
of the average American. It was going abroad,
as a stable dollar evolved into an international
currency. These growing foreign holdings of
Federal Reserve notes became an additional
factor increasing money demand and keeping
U.S. inflation in check during the 1990s.8
Ideally we should adjust the monetary
base and monetary aggregates downward, to
account for this drain abroad. Richard G.
Anderson of the St. Louis Fed estimates that
the proportion of U.S. currency held abroad
doubled between 1986 and 2005, from 25 to
nearly 50 percent. Although his estimates
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may be too low, the Fed makes no such ad-
justment. Doing so would reduce the annual
growth rate of the monetary base between
December 1986 andDecember 2005 from6.4
to 4.9 percent.9
Furthermore, in a fully deregulated mone-
tary system, private banks—not the Fed—
would be the institutions issuing currency.
Currency would become an additional bank
liability like deposits, responding to market
forces. The Fed tries to duplicate this result by
allowing thepublic todeterminehowmuchof
the base becomes currency. In other words, it
controls only the total base whereas currency
passively expands to accommodate people’s
preferences. This suggests that a more mean-
ingful approximation of the base would be
simply to subtract all currency in circulation,
leaving us with only aggregate reserves as our
proxy. Thus, the virtual freezing of reserves
turns out to be the most salient yet ignored
feature of Greenspan’s tenure. Interestingly,
the late Milton Friedman, in the 1980s, had
recommended something similar to what
Greenspan did de facto: freeze the base.10
Greenspan also helped deregulate the
broader monetary aggregates: M2, MZM, and
M3. TheDepository InstitutionsDeregulation
andMonetary Control Act of 1980 had begun
phasing out interest-rate ceilings on deposits
andmodified reserve requirements in complex
ways. Combined with subsequent administra-
tive deregulation under Greenspan through
January 1994, these changes left all the finan-
cial liabilities that M2 adds to M1—savings
deposits, small time deposits, money market
deposit accounts, and retail money market
mutual fund shares—utterly free of reserve
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Figure 1
Monetary Base (in billions)
Reserves
requirements and allowed banks to reclassify
many M1 checking accounts as M2 savings
deposits. M2 and the broader measures
became quasi-deregulated aggregates with no
legal link to the size of themonetary base.11
A result, and one that Milton Friedman
noted in 2003, is that changes in the velocity of
M2were automatically offset by changes in the
amount of M2. Interestingly, this is exactly
what monetary economists George A. Selgin
and Lawrence H. White predicted would hap-
penunder free banking, that is, amarket-deter-
mined monetary system without any govern-
ment involvement. They argued that free
bankingwould automatically adjust the quan-
tity of money to changes in velocity. If velocity
rose, signaling a fall inmoney demand,market
mechanisms would cause banks to reduce the
quantity ofmoney they created. And if velocity
fell, signaling a rise in money demand, banks
would enlarge the quantity of money. The
response of M2 to changes in velocity in the
1990s offers stunning confirmation of this
claim. The result was that inflationwas held in
check.12
Thus, during the dot-com boom of the 90s,
the velocity of M2 rose as people shifted into
stocks. But this was perfectly offset by the
declining growth rate of M2, which fell to near
zero between 1994 and 1996. Assorted Fed
watchersreachedoppositeconclusions,depend-
ing on which variable they chose to focus on.
Some warned that Greenspan’s policies were
deflationary, while others looked at the higher
growth ratesof thebase andM1,which remains
more closely tied to thebase andmoredistorted
by currency going abroad, and predicted higher
inflation.Bothwerewideof themark,of course,
butnotbecauseofGreenspan’smiraculous cen-
tral-bankdiscretion.The resultwas aproductof
market process, and when the collapse of the
dot-com boom burst theM2 velocity bubble, it
induced a new spike inM2growth.13
Why Any Inflation?
If Greenspan approximately froze total
reserves, whywas there any inflation at all dur-
ing his tenure? Rather than averaging 2.5 per-
cent annually, shouldn’t prices have remained
constant or actually fallen? The answer relates
to the market’s extraordinary capacity for
financial innovation. Because bank reserves in
the U.S. currently pay no interest (except for
required clearing balances arising from the
Fed’s check-clearing operations), banks have a
strong incentive to economize on their use.
They can figure out ways to do so even under
reserve requirements, as amply illustrated by
the origins and growth of the Federal funds
market, where banks regularly loan each other
excess reserves. Financial deregulation gave the
process an additional boost. From December
1986 to December 2005, the same period dur-
ing which aggregate reserves remained almost
constant, the aggregate, de facto reserve ratio
of thebankingsystemaswholebackingM2fell
in half: from 2.52 percent to 1.23 percent. So
the quantity of M2 deposits grew at a secular
rate of 4.6 percent, enough to generate mild,
positive, sustained inflation. And the quantity
of domestically held currency grew alongside at
an accommodating rate.14
This steady, long-term decline of reserve
ratios cannot easily be halted and confronts
government fiat money with a fatal long-run
problem. Retightening of reserve requirements
would only burden banks with an implicit tax
not faced by other financial institutions,
encouraging the development of new, highly
liquid money substitutes that effectively evade
the requirements. Congress has, moreover,
moved in theoppositedirection,permitting the
Fed to eliminate all remaining reserve require-
ments in 2011, thereby bringing the U.S. into
line with such countries as Australia, New
Zealand, Canada, the United Kingdom, and
Sweden, which have already done so. The same
act, the Financial ServicesRegulatoryRelief Act
of 2006, also authorizes the Fed, beginning in
2011, to pay interest on bank reserves held as
deposits with the Fed. But any resulting
increase in the demand for bank reserves stems
from, ineffect, transformingthatportionof the
monetary base into Treasury securities.15
In short, the ongoing spread of electronic
funds transfers and assorted cashless pay-
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The demand for base money will thus asymp-
totically approach zero. As long as the base
remains fiat money, with no other source of
demand, the price level will inexorably head
toward infinity. Only a commodity base, with
a nonmonetary demand—say gold, although
it could just as well be silver, some combina-
tion of the two, or a more complex basket of
commodities or financial assets—will anchor
the price level over the long haul. Gold will
continue to provide the unit of account, the
common numeraire in nearly all transactions,
without ever needing to be used as a medium
of exchange.16
Greenspan cannot be held responsible for
this ultimate lack of viability of fiat money,
although his deregulation accelerated the
inflationary bias. A steady, secular contraction
of total reserves could in theory have offset the
declining reserve ratio, delivering a constant
price level or even secular deflation over the
last two decades. But the continued fall of
base-moneydemand is itself inevitable, as long
as developed economies wish to capture the
enormous welfare gains of financial innova-
tion and amore efficient allocation of savings.
Conclusion
So what actually caused the current finan-
cial crisis?That is similar to askingwhat caused
the minor recessions of 1990 and 2001. Unlike
the cause of inflation, the cause of business
cycles is not obvious, which is why economists
still vigorouslydebate thequestion.Minorblips
in total reserves under Greenspan may have
played some poorly understood role in any of
these three events. Because Greenspan only
imperfectly implemented Milton Friedman’s
rule of freezing the monetary base, without
intending to do so, his policy may have ended
upslightly toodiscretionary.But thatpossibility
hardly justifies the “asset bubble” hubris of
those economic prognosticators who, only well
after the fact, declaimwith absolutely certainty
and scant attention to themonetarymeasures,
how the Fed could have pricked or prevented
such bubbles.
ThemisunderstandingofAlanGreenspan’s
management of the U.S. money stock has an
ironic coda. Before his appointment, the
Federal Reserve had proved so palpably inept
as to all but discredit discretionary monetary
policy. Bothmonetarist rules and free banking
were gaining adherents among economists.
But today, despite the recent financial turmoil,
most observers interpretGreenspan’s record as
showing either that discretionary policy can be
done right or that what is needed is some
activist pseudo-rule such as that developed by
John B. Taylor of Stanford University. Central
bankers, after half a century ormore of failure,
haveallegedly learned fromtheirpastmistakes.
Finally, according to this view, they have the
knowledge to centrally plan the money stock
properly.17
InareviewofGreenspan’smemoirs,Harvard
economist Benjamin Friedman claims that
Greenspan was a practitioner par excellence of
monetary discretion (despite his paying lip ser-
vice to laissez faire) and that Greenspan’smajor
failing was that he was notmore of a regulator.
Benjamin Friedman is wrong on both counts.
Greenspan, like the Wizard of Oz, was a lousy
wizard—but he was a good deregulator. And
that made all the difference. His success stems
from the approximation of a rigid monetary
rule and the very deregulation that Benjamin
Friedman deplores. Rather than demonstrating
thatmonetarist rulesareobsoleteandfreebank-
ing unnecessary, Greenspan’s policies suggest
that the more thoroughly either of those two
objectives is implemented, the greater the
macroeconomic stability our economy will
enjoy.18
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